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Abstract 
 
The main purpose of this paper is to show how the labour market affects Spanish individual 
fertility decisions.  Spain is an interesting case due to its huge fertility decline.  Our 
hypothesis is that precarious Spanish labour markets (i.e. high unemployment rates and fixed-
term contracts) postpone childbearing.  We test if female employment (full and part-time) is a 
barrier for family formation.  The study is done for a sample of both men and women. We 
analyse two groups, Cohort 1945–60 and Cohort 1961–77 in order to capture social changes. 
The paper focuses on the timing of marriage and the birth of a first, second and third child 
using a Cox hazard approach.  Results show that female employment delays marriage in 
Cohort 1945–60 but it has a reverse effect in Cohort 1961–77.  We also find that employed 
women (regardless of the number of hours) postpone first and second birth in any cohort, 
even accounting for any potential endogeneity between fertility and participation.  Female  
labour market instability plays an important role in family formation, especially by putting 
off marriage. From our male sample analysis we learn that male unemployment, at the 
individual level, impacts negatively on fertility only through delaying marriage. 
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1 Introduction
The main purpose of this paper is to show how the labour market, education and other
characteristics affect the individual decision to marry and have children in Spain. Our
motivation is to learn more about the decline in Spanish fertility by checking empirically
some of the ideas developed in the theory to explain family formation. Do higher ed-
ucated women experience a greater opportunity cost of having children? Is the fact of
being employed a constraint on having children for Spanish women? Is this constraint
reduced if women work part-time? Do female unemployment rates and temporary con-
tracts cause a postponement of marriage and births leading to a decline in fertility? Is
it true that high external income facilitates the expansion of the family? How do so-
cial and demographic variables affect the timing of marriage and births? The analysis is
done for two groups, the old cohort (women born 1945–60) and young cohort (1961–77)
since the role of women in society, especially as a worker, was quite different in these two
periods. We also examine the role of men in family formation by looking at a male sample.
Although some studies have been done on this topic (see Section 2), we believe that
there is scope for further research, especially for the Spanish case. The starting point of
the decline of the Spanish birth rate dates back to the late 1970s. Nowadays, fertility
rates in Spain are lower than in any other country in the EU, except for Italy. In 2001,
the US Bureau of Census reported that fertility rates were the following: Spain (1.15),
Italy (1.18), Sweden (1.53), the Netherlands (1.65), UK (1.72) and US (2.06).
Low fertility rates have both social and economic origin. There exists a negative rela-
tionship between the number of hours supplied in the labour market and the number of
children in the household across individuals. Female education is also linked to having
fewer children, both through its effect on employment opportunities and on the use of
contraceptive methods.
Part of the sharp decrease in Spanish fertility is due to the fact that women are now
more educated and they are entering the labour market in larger numbers. However,
other countries also experienced this phenomenon (some time before) but their fertility
rates never fell to the current levels in Spain (e.g. see Figure 7 in Appendix C). This
means that, although some percentage of the decline can be explained by mass entry into
the labour force and the rise of education, one should also look for other possible reasons.
This is what makes the Spanish case (together with other Southern European countries)
particularly interesting.
One hypothesis is that countries such as the US, the Netherlands and Sweden achieved
a higher stable fertility rate (after their initial decline) than that in Spain thanks to their
more flexible labour markets and their government policies. This means that in these
countries being employed places less of a constraint on women having children. More-
over, they are characterised by lower unemployment rates and fewer temporary contracts,
which allows them to marry (or cohabit) at a younger age.
The increase in education does cause a reduction in the willingness to have a child. How-
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ever, what other nations have attained is what is called the ‘two-child norm’ (Hoem and
Hoem (1989)). In general, women start building a family at an older age compared to
previous cohorts but they end up with two children. This suggests that further female
education explains part of the decline of the Spanish fertility rates but not all. The impact
of the level of education on the drop in fertility is strongly linked to the structure of the
labour market, that is, how flexible it is and how many opportunities it offers. In other
words, if the Spanish labour market were more similar to that in other countries, then
Spanish couples would probably form their own households before they currently do and
educated women would end up with the same two-child norm.
The previous statement is particularly true with regards to the US. Many American
women go to university, work and have children. They know that the market offers them
alternative chances after the birth of their children. Spanish women perceive a greater
opportunity cost of becoming pregnant at equivalent US educational levels since work
opportunities for mothers are scarce. Spanish unemployment rates are huge and by the
time they get a permanent contract, which facilitates stability, they are already in their
mid-thirties. In 1984, the government decided to liberalize the labour market because of
the rise in unemployment (Saint-Paul (2000)). However, rather than reducing dismissal
costs for permanent workers, which is politically difficult to implement, they increased the
use of temporary labour contracts. The result of this reform was that temporary contracts
represent 95% of new hires. Later on, it was shown that this policy had not succeeded in
its objective of reducing unemployment. Even if initially, there was a boost in hiring, in
the following recession (mid-nineties) employment dropped rapidly since firms could take
advantage of the temporary contracts and easily get rid of their workers. This attempt
to increase flexibility basically affected young people and consequently, young potential
couples. Without a stable employment contract, they were not willing to start a fam-
ily. Thus, the labour market differences ensure that women with equivalent schooling are
willing to have a child in the US but are reluctant to do so in Spain.
US fertility rates stabilised with many mothers working full-time whereas in the Nether-
lands they did with many women working part-time. The Netherlands has been taken
as an example of a country where the labour market is flexible and people can voluntar-
ily decide to work part-time. Under the latter option, women are able to combine both
working and having children. In the Dutch society it is understood that either women or
men take some time off in order to take care of their children, and companies are willing
to offer this free choice.
Sweden finally exemplifies the intervention of the government in childcare policy. This can
be another alternative that helps prevent the observed Spanish tendency towards lower
fertility. Both private and public Swedish companies are characterised by their provision
of childcare and maternity leave. Moreover, the atmosphere in the labour market is such
that firms are more willing to employ potential mothers.
To summarise, it is true that part of the recent drop in Spanish fertility rates can be
explained by factors similar to those experienced by other countries. The additional drop
is due to the fact that educated women who wish to combine work with raising a family are
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discouraged from doing so by the labour market structure. The opportunity cost of having
children at similar schooling levels is greater in Spain than in other countries because of
high unemployment and labour market instability. As such, we argue that the structure
of the labour market has an important role in explaining the phenomenon of low fertil-
ity in Spain. Fewer couples decide to marry, and they do it later. Furthermore, among
married women, more remain without children since they are afraid of losing their careers.
We would like to clarify that the aim of this study is not to explain differences in fertility
across countries. This goes beyond the purpose of our analysis. We do not investigate
how socio-economic explanatory variables impact on the timing of family formation in
other countries either.1 The contribution of our paper is to provide further knowledge
about fertility decisions only in the Spanish case.
The paper is organised as follows: in Section 2, we summarize the contribution of other
authors on this topic. In Section 3 we introduce the methodology applied. Section 4
explains our data sources and explanatory variables. In Section 5 we describe some de-
mographic features such as age of marriage, number of children per cohort and mothers’
participation. We next focus on our model in Section 6. The aim is to analyse the tim-
ing of family formation with a hazard approach. We propose alternative estimations in
Section 7 in order to overcome issues such as endogeneity between fertility and female
participation. In Section 8 results are discussed, both for the female and the male sample.
We then summarise our findings and conclude in Section 9.
2 Related Literature
There are several papers that provide evidence at microeconomic level on how observable
characteristics, mainly female employment and education, affect women’s fertility timing.
For the Scandinavian welfare states, Hoem and Hoem (1989) analyse the effect of women’s
employment on second and third births in Sweden. They find that those variables with
greatest impact on the hazard for the second birth are a woman’s employment status,
her educational level, and whether she is cohabiting or is married. When looking at the
third birth, the following regressors are found to be important: age at first birth and the
elapsed interval between her first two births (demographic characteristics). Their mari-
tal status seems to be minor for the third birth. Their paper emphasises the preference
of two children (two-child norm) in modern Sweden. They also describe the role of the
Swedish public sector, which has improved job opportunities for women and has enabled
both partners to combine homemaking with paid employment. This has enabled 80% of
women with children in the kindergarten to work, many of them part-time. Surprisingly,
they find no significant difference on the effect of working full or part-time on the hazard.
One initially would think that more family oriented women tend to work part-time. They
justify the result by an income explanation. Couples with women working full-time have
a higher income and can afford to have more children. More recently, Kravdal (2000)
1Comparison with other countries is important in this context. In order to cover this gap, we are
currently extending our duration analysis for other countries in a related paper.
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studies the effect of unemployment, both at micro and macro level, on fertility in Norway
between 1991 and 1998. She finds that unemployment has had a weak impact on births,
which might be due to the fact that people are supported by a generous welfare system.
There are also studies for market-oriented economies. The paper by Harvey (1996) anal-
yses the effect of female employment on the likelihood and timing of second and higher
order pregnancies for the US. The author uses pregnancy as the unit of measure since
he thinks that it is pregnancy and not birth that employed women try to avoid. The
paper finds an important negative impact of full-time2 employment on fertility for the
second and fourth pregnancies, but not so for the third pregnancy. This suggests that
something other than employment may be more crucial in determining the probability
of a third than a second or fourth one for women who work full-time. Also for the US,
Hodson and Mooney (1981) write about the effects of the timing of marriage and first
birth on the spacing of subsequent births. There are several factors that relate age at
marriage with fertility. For example, fecundity has its peak at early ages and contracep-
tive methods will be expected to be used more effectively by older couples since they are
more mature. The authors point out some aspects that make the relationship between the
timing of marriage and first birth and subsequent child spacing misleading. For instance,
those who use ineffective contraceptive methods are likely to marry earlier because they
are induced to do so because of premarital conception. The results of their paper show
that there exists a direct relationship between the number of births and the experience of
rapid fertility. For example, about 80% of those who had three children at the time of the
interview had their first child within two years of marriage, but only 35% of those who
had one child at the time of the survey had that child within two years after marriage.
The latter is rejected by Heckman, Hotz and Walker (1985),3 which investigate whether it
is true that the timing of marriage and the lengths of prior intervals affect the spacing of
subsequent births once they control for unobserved heterogeneity. In fact, they find that
if unobserved heterogeneity is taken into account, the pattern that longer preceding birth
interval causes longer subsequent birth intervals’ disappears. Groat, Neal and Workman
(1996) analyse the family formation of working mothers in the US. They find that the
longer the marital work duration, the longer the interval between marriage and first child.
Another result is that the lowest fertility level is among mothers who have worked the
greatest proportions of their married lives, at high status jobs, and before the birth of
the first child. Cooman, Ermisch and Joshi (1987) focus on the probability of a birth
given income in England and Wales. Their model confirms that not only demographic
characteristics but also economic variables are important in explaining the fluctuations
in fertility, in particular its timing. Del Bono (2001) has recently contributed into this
area by looking at the impact of unemployment and employment expectations on fertility
in the UK. She finds that a spell of unemployment induces women to delay childbearing.
Those women who expect high future wages are more likely to postpone first birth, ceteris
paribus. On the other hand, if women predict more favourable job opportunities, they
bring forward the birth event.
After German unification, fertility patterns changed considerably in East Germany. Kreyen-
2Part-time employment impacts negatively but it is not significant.
3Their analysis is based on a Swedish sample.
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feld (2000) analyses the impact of unemployment at micro level on the timing of first birth.
Her paper concludes that spells on female unemployment actually increase the hazard for
first birth in East-Germany, which goes in opposite direction of what Del Bono (2001)
finds for the UK.
Less research has been done for Spain. We are aware of an important piece of work
by Ahn and Mira (2001) who use the 1991 Spanish Socio-demographic Survey. They look
at the the links between high male unemployment rates and the decline in fertility in
Spain. Their results provide strong evidence that periods of non-employment have a sig-
nificant negative effect on the probability of marriage. Part-time or temporary contracts
have also played a negative role, which suggests that the instability of jobs among young
men causes the delay of marriage and childbearing among the Spanish couples. Our anal-
ysis differs from theirs in several aspects. We focus on both females and males whereas
they only investigate males. We also highlight changes in society by dividing our sample
into two cohorts (1945–60 and 1961–77). Baiza´n, Aassve and Billari (2001) contributes
to the Spanish case by modelling simultaneously first birth and union formation. They
find evidence that these two events are correlated. Consequently, they claim that in order
to obtain reliable estimates, studies should include a heterogeneity component that ac-
counts for their mutual dependence. Looking at the economic variables, their results show
that being employed reduces women’s likelihood of marriage and first birth. The latter
is true regardless they take account of the unobserved factor influencing simultaneously
first birth and first union.4
3 Methodology
Our purpose is to analyse the principal determinants of the decisions to get married and
to have children. Since we are interested in the impact of employment, education and
labour market characteristics on these decisions, we will mainly focus on these variables.
To analyse the process, we model the timing between different demographic states (single
to married, married without children to one child, from one child to two children and from
two to three). The tool applied to study the timing of marriage and births is the duration
model. Econometric duration models are used to analyse the main factors (observable and
non-observable) that determine the duration in a given state. In other words, they anal-
yse the probability of an event occurring at a particular time, given that the individual
was at risk at that time. Fertility decisions are based on sociological factors, demographic
characteristics, education and the employment trajectories. The hazard model applied to
family creation tells us, given employment, education and other factors, the probability
that a woman will get married in the next month. When looking at the first child, it
predicts the probability that a woman at risk with those characteristics will have a first
child in the next month. The same interpretation is extended for the second and third
child.
4We would like to point out, however, that the impact of economic variables (e.g. education, employ-
ment and work experience) remains fairly constant with the same interpretation in the two specifications
(with and without accounting for interdependence). Thus, we believe that if one is interested in the
impact of this type of covariate, one need not be overly concerned about correlations between first birth
and marriage in Spain.
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To summarize, these microeconomic models allow us to study how observable characteris-
tics influence positively or negatively the chances that a woman gets married or increases
the size of her family. These covariates can be either time varying or fixed. Since we
are interested in how the employment and education path affects the family creation tra-
jectory, we do have time-varying variables, which tell us at each period the employment
status and the educational attainment of the woman. We also introduce regional unem-
ployment rates that correspond to a particular month. This provides a measure of how
a woman forecasts the risk of temporarily abandoning her job and how the economy is
performing. Moreover, there are also some social factors that influence the hazard, which
are taken as constant covariates (for instance, the number of siblings, religion and region).
The hazard is not only a function of characteristics but also of the time a woman has
already spent in a certain state.
4 Data and Covariates
The data come from the ‘Family and Fertility Survey’, a data set collected by the Centro
de Investigaciones Sociolo´lgicas (CIS) between June and November of 1995. The structure
of the questionnaire was originally produced by the United Nations and it was applied in
Spain in 1995. The sample is built at the national level with individuals aged between
18 and 49 years old. The number of valid interviews was 4021 for women and 1991 men,
obtained with a percentage of responses of 83.6% and 77% respectively.
CIS questioned women in the 17 regions (Comunidades Auto´nomas) in proportion to
the population. Each individual responds to the survey at a particular moment of time.
Then, she is asked to give information about her past. That is, the poll asks every woman
to build up her history: for instance, the dates of her marriage, first cohabitation, sequence
of jobs (starting and ending date of her job for up to 30 different employments), calendar
of children born and sequence of schooling (up to 10 different courses). In consequence,
since it is a retrospective survey there will be errors coming from the individuals’ lack of
memory.
In particular, we are interested in building the timing of their marriage and fertility,
their job career and schooling in order to link the paths. The purpose is to figure out
monthly whether the female is single, married without family, or has one, two or more
children. Furthermore, we need to know the employment status and education achieved
in that month. The starting point of the timing is 15 years. That is, when the person is
15 years old, she is deemed to be in period 0. One month later, she is in period 1, and one
year later she is in period 12. The reason why the counter begins at 15 is that initially we
model the duration to marriage. Since the unit of time is taken monthly, it makes sense
to initiate the timing at 15 years. There were only three persons in my sample who had
married before. These cases were discarded.
The variables used in the analysis include time-varying dummy variables that reveal the
employment status of the woman at each month Emplo. That is, Emplo takes value one if
the person was employed at the beginning of each period and zero otherwise. The variable
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Schm is one if the individual is at school and zero if not. For reasons we will explain later,
we have constructed lag variables of Emplo and Schm for six and twelve months (Em-
plo6, Emplo12, Schm6, Schm12 ). Furthermore, since we are interested in timing, we have
dummy variables for education that tells us the highest level the person had achieved by
that specific month. Because of the structure of the questionnaire, we are able to know if
the woman is studying a certain degree in that month and if she succeeded. Therefore, the
variable created takes the value of the degree at that month if she passed the degree, and
the inferior level if she did not. The scale of the degrees goes from zero to six in accord
with the International Standard Classification of Education (ISCED). Level 0 starts at
the age of 3, 4 or 5 and it lasts from one to three years. Category 1 in the ISCED refers
to primary education and normally starts at the age of 5, 6 or 7 and continues five years.
Levels 2 and 3 belong to the secondary school, to the first and second cycle (starting at
11 or 12, and 14 or 15, respectively). Level 4 is generally achieved four years after the
individual is 17 or 18 and it is a vocational degree. Finally, categories 5 and 6 refer to
a university degree and postgraduate degree, respectively. From this variable, we have
constructed four dummy variables E1 (with value one if the maximum level is 0 or 1),
E2 (one if the individual belongs to category 2 or 3), E3Voc (one if she has level 4) and
E3GrPo (one if she is at 5 or 6).
Furthermore, there are other time-varying variables that provide information about the
occupational history of each female. First of all, in order to check if it makes a difference
for the analysis to work part or full time we have created the following three dummy vari-
ables: NonE is one if at that month the woman is not employed at all; FTE is one if the
woman is employed 35 or more hours and PTE is one if she is employed less than 35 hours.
We believe that the evolution of unemployment has had a great impact on the fertil-
ity trajectory. The variable Unemrf links the regional female unemployment rate to a
particular individual date. That is, if month 30 of individual x is May of 1978, Unemrf
is the regional unemployment rate of that quarter. Unfortunately, regional time series
are available only from the second quarter of 1976 (Instituto Nacional de Estadistica).
Thus, prior to this date, we have computed the earliest regional unemployment rates in
the following way. We take the ratio between each regional unemployment rate and the
national unemployment rate in the earliest quarter available (third term of 1976). The
regional to national unemployment ratio is assumed to be constant through time. Since
there exists data on national unemployment rates, we can use these constant ratios to
estimate the regional unemployment rates. For the same reason as Emplo and Schm, we
construct Unemrf6 and Unemrf12.
The atmosphere of job security also influences the decision to build a family. In 1984,
the Spanish government introduced a policy to liberalize the labour market, Following
this reform, by 1990 temporary contracts accounted for 95% of new hires and 30% of
employment. For this reason, we have included a variable that measures the percentage
of female employees that have temporary contracts Tempf at national level. The lags of
this covariate are Tempf6 and Tempf12. This variable takes the value zero for quarters
prior to 1984 since there were then no temporary contracts in Spain. Despite the fact
this form of contract was initiated in 1984, there is no data available on number of em-
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ployees under each type of contract before the second quarter of 1987. Thus, we have
computed the missing values assuming the number of temporal contracts grew linearly
from zero in the first quarter of 1984 to the number existing in the second quarter of 1987.
The rest of the explanatory variables are constant along the segment of a woman’s life
subject to study. These are social background factors such as the number of siblings (Sib-
ling), if her parents were divorced (DivPar), if she is religious (Religious) and the region
where she is living. The latter has been constructed in seven dummy variables following
the NUTS categorization.5 There is no information on moving region. This is the reason
why it is taken as a fixed covariate, enforced by the fact that Spain is not characterised
by high migration. The region where a woman is living at the interview date is probably
the place where she has settled her life. We incorporate a variable for the taste for work
(WorkTaste) that takes value one if the person was at work one year after she completed
education. Cohort dummies are included with five years’ intervals.
When studying the timing to the first child, we incorporate further fixed variables. Age of
marriage AgeMa, which is accounted as months from the fifteenth birthday and education
achieved by the partner (E1P, E2P, E3VocP and E3GrPoP) in dummy variables.
In the analysis of timing to the second child, apart from the partner’s education, there is
the age at first birth (AgeAt1C ), the duration between the marriage and the first birth
(MenT1C ) and a dummy variable equal to 1 when the first child was a girl (Girl).
Finally, when looking at the third birth, the extra variables are age at second birth
(AgeAt2C ), the duration of the previous spell (MenT2C ) and two dummy variables that
take value 1 if the first two children were girls (TwoGirls) or boys (TwoBoys).
In the analysis of the probability of leaving the single state, individuals are censored
at the date of the interview if they did not marry before. Period zero corresponds to
the fifteenth birthday and the unit of time is months. Individuals who married before
that time have been removed from the sample. For the estimation of the probability of
having a first child, individuals were censored at the date of the interview, or at the time
one of the members of the couple had had an operation to make pregnancy impossible.
They were also censored at the time they separated, divorced or widowed. The same
criterion was followed for the second and third child. Mothers who gave birth to twins
were dropped out from the sample as well as births before the marriage.
One might think that, rather than being employed or not some time before the preg-
nancy or marriage, what really matters is the way a woman perceives her chances of
getting back to work. This is the reason why we have constructed a variable that tells us
the probability that a woman will be employed given her education and labour market be-
haviour. In order to compute the chances of this re-employment proxy, we have estimated
a probit. The dependent variable takes value 1 if employed and 0 otherwise. Ideally, we
5NW (Galicia, Principado de Asturias, Cantabria); NE (Pa´is Vasco, Navarra, La Rioja y Arago´n);
C (Castilla Leo´n, Castilla la Mancha y Extremadura); CMadrid; E (Catalunya, Comunidad Valenciana,
Baleares); S (Andaluc´ia y Murcia); Canaries.
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Table 1: Number of Subjects in Cohort 1945–60
Marriage 1st Birth 2nd Birth 3rd Birth
Total 1150 1041 1007 824
Exits 1072 1011 857 338
Censored 68 30 150 486
Table 2: Number of Subjects in Cohort 1961–77
Marriage 1st Birth 2nd Birth 3rd Birth
Total 2228 1024 821 436
Exits 1082 829 444 74
Censored 1146 195 377 362
would like to be able to set the dependent variable 0 when the person is unemployed (i.e.
to compute the probability of employment given she is in the labour force), but in the
data one is not able to distinguish between inactivity and unemployment.
Table 1 summarises the number of subjects, both who exit6 and are censored, for the
old cohort (born in 1945–60). Table 2 gives the same information for the young cohort
(born in 1961–77).
5 Descriptive Statistics
Data show a postponing in the age of marriage. In the old cohort, by the age of 30, 93.4%
of them were married whereas only 83.0% of the cohort 1961–65 was married at this age.7
There is a positive correlation between education and age of marriage, which is much
stronger in the young cohort. This correlation is 0.15 for the old cohort, whereas i t  is 0.37
for the young group. Data show also a rise in the levels of education for each age of
marriage. For instance, among women who married between 15 and 19 years old, 12.9%
did not finished the primary school in the old cohort. Only 5.3% did not in the young
cohort. Among women who married between 25–29 years old, 6.1% obtained a university
degree in the old group whereas 19.8% did so in the young group.
If one compares the two cohorts by levels of education, women with the same level of
schooling tend to marry later in the young cohort. For instance, among graduate women,
52% of the old cohort marries between 20 and 25 years old, and 28% did between 25 and
30 years old. However, among the young cohort, 25% of graduate females get married in
6Individuals who exit are those who move from one state to another (e.g. from single to married).
The censored individuals are those who you stop observing before they exit.
7Note that for the calculation of this percentage we take a sub-sample of what we call young cohort
(1961–77), since only women born before 1965 are observed beyond 30 years.
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the interval 20–25 and 50% do so in the interval 25–30. There are two possible explana-
tions. On one hand, one of the targets of women born before the 60s was to get married
(at all education levels) because of the traditional society. On the other hand, nowadays
women are more demanding in their career aspirations and they wish to settle into their
jobs before getting married. The Spanish labour market in the 80s and 90s did not help
because of its huge unemployment rates and unstable contracts. This delays entry to the
labour market by graduate women and thus postpones marriage.
In both cohorts, higher education is linked to longer duration between marriage and
first child. The main difference between the two cohorts comes in levels of education
2, 3 and 4, respectively secondary school first level, secondary school second level and
vocational studies. These education levels have a higher proportion of individuals that take
more than two years to give birth from the date of marriage. For example, 7.1% of women
with level 4 have a duration from marriage to first child longer than 2 years in the old
cohort, whereas 51.9% do so in the young cohort.
In the relationship education vs spell to second birth, those with the highest levels of
schooling tend to spread the births over more than two years. As expected, high edu-
cated females delay first birth longer after marriage, this effect being stronger in Cohort
1961–77. Interestingly, the graduate group experiences an increase in the proportion of
women having the second birth less than two years after the first one. For example, 93%
of graduate mothers took more than two years after the first child to have their second
one in Cohort 1945–60. The percentage is 61% for Cohort 1961–77.

Figure 1 represents the proportion of women who had the first child within two years
of marriage by the age at marriage
when the age of marriage is less than 19 years old. From that age on, the old cohort show
. Younger cohorts seem to have shorter durations
a greater proportion of married women having children within two years of their marriage.
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Figure 2: Number of Children of Married Women at 35 Years Old
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Hazard models allow us to search for the main features that influence the timing of births
and compare among cohorts. Note that the picture refers to women who are married.
Spanish women still generally marry before having children. In the old cohort, 2.5% of
the women had a baby before they got married. In the young cohort, the percentage is
5%. It is also interesting to study the timing to marriage, since fewer women get married
and those who do, marry later. This plays an important role in fertility since fecundity
has its peak at early ages. The later a couple cohabit together, the later they will have
children and the shorter will be the fertile spell.
Female labour force participation influences family formation. In the old cohort, among
those women who had at least one child at the time of the interview, 37% were employed
when they married. For the sample 1961–1965,8 45% of women with at least one child
were employed. If we focus on employed women, 98% of those who were employed in
high skill profile jobs at the time of the marriage had at least one child by the time of
the interview in the old cohort. This percentage is reduced to 82% among women born
between 1960 and 1965. Among low skill profile jobs, the percentages of women who
had at least one child by the time of the interview are respectively 96% and 92% for the
old and young cohort. There is a slight increasing tendency to remain childless. 64% of
women in the old sample who were working in high profile jobs at the time of their first
birth had a second birth in the old cohort whereas 45% had at least two children in the
cohort 1961–1965. The percentages for low skill profile jobs are respectively 81% and 65%
for the two cohorts. This shows a reduction of fertility among employed people or, at
least, a postponement of family formation since the young cohort for this comparison is
aged between 30 and 35 at the interview. Women employed in more skill demanding jobs
8In these statistics, we omit relevant information in the computation of number of children such as
how old the woman is. For a fair comparison we take only individuals aged 30 or more at the interview
for group 1961–1977.
11
have fewer children.
Despite the fact fertility has dropped, people in the two cohorts do not report significant
differences in the ideal number of children for a Spanish family. Table 11 in Appendix
B summarises the women’s preferences. Many women in the young cohort consider two
children as an ideal number but they do not have them. Figure 2 shows the proportion of
married women who have any, one, two, three and four or more children at 35 years old
for three cohorts (1950, 1955 and 1960). The plot tells us that the percentage of women
with any or only one child has increased whereas the percentage for three and four has
diminished.
6 Model
As previously mentioned, the tool used to study the timing of marriage and births is the
duration model. The two basic concepts are the following: survival and hazard function.
The survival function tells the probability of ‘surviving’ (remaining) in a specific state.
The hazard function specifies the probability of exiting (leaving) a particular state.
6.1 Hazard Functions
h(t|x) = lim
∆t→
1
∆t
Pr(t <= T < t+ |T >= t, x)9 (1)
The exit or hazard rate of marriage implies the conditional probability density function
of leaving a status of being single to being married, given that the individual has been
single for a certain time and given her characteristics. The exit or hazard rate of first
birth is the probability of exiting the state of being married with no children to the state of
having one child, given that the particular couple has been married for a specific period
and given her characteristics. One can reproduce this methodology to study the change of state
from one child to two, from two to three, and so on. We will avoid pointing out that what
is explained about moving from a situation of being married with no children to another
one with one child can be generalized to any other shift between two states (e.g. single
to married, married with one child to married with two children).
Let f(t|x) be the unconditional (with respect to the time) probability density function
of exit from one state to another and F (t|x) the cumulative distribution function for an
individual with characteristics x. The definition of the hazard function h(t|x) implies:
h(t|x) = f(t|x)/(1− F (t|x)) (2)
The denominator in Equation 2, i.e. the complement of F (t|x), is the survival function
S(t|x) representing the probability of ‘surviving’ in a specific state. Here the survival rate
means, for example, the probability at time t that a woman remains single.
9x is the vector of explanatory variables (that might be dependent or independent of time). T is a
random variable of the exit time.
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As mentioned, the exit rate from a state depends upon the time spent in that state
and the individual characteristics. Consider, for example, the exit rate from the state
of being married with no children to the state of being married with one child. There
are a number of factors that might cause the hazard rate to change (in both directions)
during the spell of marriage with no child, implying duration dependence. The first is
that the longer the couple has been married, the older is the woman and her husband.
It is a biological fact that women and men become less fertile as they age. This implies
negative duration dependence. That is, the exit rate depends negatively on time. On the
other hand, it is possible to find arguments that go in favour of positive time dependence.
For instance, some couples may wish to get settled before having children. Furthermore,
some couples may require some kind of treatment to facilitate their reproduction. The
existence of duration dependence has to be checked empirically. It might be that how
long the couple has been married has no impact and it is only the individual characteris-
tics of both members of the couple that determines the change of state. This will be in
accordance with an exponential baseline hazard.
In Equation 2, the possibility of duration dependence is expressed by the t-argument
in h(t|x). Duration dependence is positive if the hazard rises with duration (δh/δt > 0)
and negative if it falls (δh/δt < 0). As already mentioned, the net direction of the effects
indicated above is an empirical matter. The exit rate is also a function of the individual
characteristics (x), which can be constant or time-varying. The features that are constant
are those who do not change along the time of analysis (for example, region or religion).
Time-varying covariates are characteristics that vary in time such as the employment sta-
tus of the individual.
The most common assumption is to make the time profile of the hazard function in-
dependent of x. Then, h is formed by two factors: a function of regressor variables, x,
given by Φ1(x), and a function of time h0(t):
h(t|x) = Φ1(x) ∗ h0(t) (3)
This specification is the Proportional hazard models (PH-models) since two different cou-
ples have hazards that are in fixed proportions for any t (Cox and Oakes (1984)). So the
hazard rate exhibits the same time path for all couples, except for proportional vertical
shifts caused by differences in the regressors’ values.
The hazard has to be positive. Hence, the factor Φ1 is taken as an exponential:
Φ1 = exp(x
′β) (4)
giving
h(t|x) = exp(x′β) ∗ h0(t). (5)
For the baseline hazard h0(t), one might adopt parametric or semi-parametric specifica-
tions (where it is not constrained to belong to a specific parametric family). Forcing the
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hazard baseline function to take a particular shape may be a disadvantage if the para-
metric function does not fit properly the duration dependence.10 This is why we use the
semi-parametric Cox model, which allows derivation of the coefficients for the explana-
tory variables, but places no restrictions at all on the shape of the baseline hazard. Then,
depending on the form of the baseline, one could compare the results with a parametric
specification. Two examples of parametric specifications are the Exponential and the
Weibull. The former is a model with h0 = 1. The exponential parameterisation assumes
that the hazard is independent of time. One can generalise the Exponential model to the
Weibull where
h0(t) = αt
α−1, α > 0. (6)
The hazard rises or falls monotonically according as α > 1 or α < 1. The case α = 1
comes back to the exponential model.
The appropriate likelihood function for our sample, derived by Lancaster (1979),11 repre-
sents the likelihood of the events in the period during which the exit process is monitored,
say Li. Therefore, we may face complete and incomplete spells. For example, in the case
of first birth, complete spells occur when the realised time of being married with no child,
Ti, is less than the period of observation Li. Their contribution to the likelihood function
is through the density function evaluated at that point. With incomplete spells, there are
two cases: left censored (when the moment the couple entered into the married with no
child state is unknown) and right censored (when it is unknown when the couple left this
state). Normally people do not consider left censored spells (they are eliminated from
the sample). Under the current paper, we do not face the problem of the left-censored
spells since we know the dates of marriages and births. Usually, when one talks about
incomplete spells it is referred to right censored ones, which contribute to the likelihood
by the survival function evaluated at Li. Individuals are censored at the interview date,
when either they or their partners are sterilized, or when they separated, divorced or
widowed.
The likelihood can thus be written as:
L =
∏
NU
f(Ti, xi)
∏
NC
S(Li, xi) (7)
where NU stands for the uncensored cases, while NC for the censored cases. An alternative
way to write the likelihood function is
L =
n∏
i=1
fi(ti|xi)δiSi(ti|xi)1−δi (8)
where δi is the censor indicator (takes value 1 for uncensored observations, and 0 for
censored ones).
Equation 8 can be written as a log-likelihood function in terms of the hazard and the
10Ridder (1987) shows that a flexible baseline hazard is also favorable if we are concerned about
unobserved heterogeneity.
11Also Lancaster (1990).
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cumulative hazard function:12
l =
n∑
i=1
δilnh(ti|xi)−
n∑
i=1
H(ti|xi). (9)
The log-likelihood function is then maximised with respect to its parameters.
6.2 Kaplan-Meier Survival Estimation
The product limit estimator or the Kaplan-Meier estimator is based only on the data of
the sample and is non-parametric. This estimator is computed as follows
Ŝ(t) =
j∏
j|tj<=t
(
nj − dj
nj
) (10)
where nj is the risk set at time j, dj is the number of failures at time j, and the product
is over all distinct failures times less than or equal to time j. The risk set at time j(nj)
is the number of spells neither completed nor censored before time j.
Kaplan-Meier Survival estimates give the probability of remaining in the same state (e.g.
not to have an additional child) at a particular moment of time. Despite the fact these
estimates omit characteristics, they are a useful first step to analyse the differences between
two groups. For example, Figure 3 represents the Kaplan-Meier Survival13 in the Single
state estimates for the two cohorts. The young cohort shows a higher survival rate in the
single state for all t, which reinforces our strategy of splitting the analysis between the
two cohorts. This enables us to seek changes in the social and economic determinants of
family formation across these two age groups. The same exercise is repeated for surviving
in the Married Childless state (Figure 4), where time zero corresponds to the date of each
woman’s marriage. Figure 5 and Figure 6 show the Kaplan-Meier Survival estimation
in the state of Married with one and two children, respectively. These pictures provide
evidence that the young cohort has a greater probability to survive in each state at all
durations (note that these graphs do not incorporate the effect of the covariates). This
is particularly true for the survival rate in the ‘Single State’ and the ‘Married With Two
Children State’. Therefore, we observe that the two cohorts behave differently, especially
in their decision when to marry and the timing to the third child.
As mentioned in Section 4, the survey was carried out in 1995 and historical information
was collected retrospectively. This implies that older women in 199514 are in general
observed over a longer time, which means that the number of censored individuals with
respect to the total is expected to be larger in the young cohort. We would like to measure
if differences in observed periods could lead to erroneous statements. In order to try to
account for this effect, we have replicated the old cohort’s Kaplan-Meier estimations by
’artificially’ truncating data as the young cohort, building the histories for them only up
12The cumulative hazard function is defined as H(t|x) = ∫ t
0
h(s|x)ds.
13The analysis time is measured in months, being zero at the individual’s 15th birthday.
14Sample aged 18–49.
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Figure 3: Survival in the Single State. Cohort Comparison
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Figure 4: Survival in the Married Without Children State. Cohort Comparison
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to 1980 (even if women were questioned in 1995). Thus, the individuals who are observed
further in both cohorts are aged 35. This ’artificial’ exercise shows that these two groups
still fall apart. Kaplan-Meier Survival curves for the old and young cohort are even more
spread out, especially towards the third child. These graphs are in Appendix C .1 (Figures
8, 9, 10 and 11).
7 Estimation
The decision to get married is taken some time before the big day. This is why most time
varying variables are taken six months before the current time in the estimation for the
hazard of marriage. These are: Schm6, Emplo6, Unemrf6 and Tempf6. Female education
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Figure 5: Survival in the Married With One Child State. Cohort Comparison
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Figure 6: Survival in the Married With Two Children State. Cohort Comparison
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is also a time-varying variable. Nevertheless, its value in the estimation is not lagged
since it can be accurately predicted at the time of decision. The decision to give birth
is also taken some months before the child is born. Thus, there are also lag variables
for the estimation of the birth timing: Schm12, Emplo12, Unemrf12 and Tempf12.15 By
taking the lags of labour market covariates we also reduce the concern of fertility and
employment being simultaneously decided.16
One could be concerned about the fact that the decision of marriage and first birth
15We have also tried with a lag of nine months but the results were basically the same.
16Later in the paper we discuss how we tackle the problem of endogeneity between fertility and female
labour supply.
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are endogenous. Some research has been done in order to measure the importance of this
effect. For example, Baiza´n et al. (2001) use a simultaneous hazard equations approach
in order to overcome potential bias caused by the correlation between the process of first
birth and union formation. In order to validate how the mutual dependence of the deci-
sion could have an effect on our results, we have undertaken the estimation by taking time
zero 7 months after the marriage. In this case, we select those women whose marriage was
definitely not simultaneous to the birth. We find that our estimates are not significantly
different from the estimation where the counter is taken at the marriage date. Thus, we
claim that we do not have to be preoccupied that our results are misleading because of
this potential endogeneity. We believe that this is supported by Baiza´n et al. (2001).
They find minor changes in their economic explanatory variables once they control for an
unobserved correlation process component. For instance, in their specifications (with and
without allowing for mutual dependence), employment reduces the hazard of first birth
and marriage, being the absolute value greater under the simultaneous model. Despite
the fact that they show that correlation matters, the interpretation on their economic
covariates is not inverted.
Another drawback is the endogeneity between fertility and female labour supply. For
example, we could argue that more family oriented women abandon their working life be-
fore the birth itself, so that the causal relation is, in fact, reversed. For instance, Angrist
and Evans (1998) show that female employment and childbearing are endogenous. Notice
that lagging our time-varying covariates partly overcomes it.17 In addition, we create a
variable that accounts for the taste for work. That is, if we assume that the employ-
ment variable is endogenous because ’taste for work’ is omitted and ’taste for work’ has
a positive impact on employment and a negative impact, ceteris paribus, on fertility, we
need to control for ’taste for work’. Thus, we include a covariate taste for work in our re-
gression. This variable (WorkTaste)18 captures the the relevant preference and leaves our
time-varying Emplo12 free from spurious meaning. If Emplo12 turns out to be negative
and significant, this implies that being at work reduces the likelihood of having a further
child at that time, no matter what is your career taste.
The estimation of the parameters for the family timing for the female sample has been
done under two different perspectives, which we call Reduced and Structural form. In
the male sample we only use the former. We believe that one of the main variables that
determine each demographic decision (overall in the young cohort) is the expectation of
being employed at each time ( ̂PEmplo). That is, if a woman decides to have a child, she
is concerned about the probability she will remain employed at the period of the birth.
Among several features, her expectation ( ̂PEmplo) depends primarily on her education
and lagged employment characteristics. ( ̂PEmplo) is informative since it gives women’s
perception of her chances of being employed at each time. That is, if she expects to be
employed or not given her characteristics. This is an important element for her decision.
Not only the fact of being employed or not one year before the birth matters, but also
17Women who decide to have a child might drop employment before the birth if they are home-oriented.
This is why it is important to lag the employment status variable at12 months. We also estimate the hazard
with a lag of 18 and 24 months to ensure that we avoid capturing the inverse causality in our results.
18It takes value one if the person was at work one year after she completed education.
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the chances to be employed after.
( ̂PEmplo) is a time-varying variable, which results from a probit estimation of the proba-
bility to be employed given individual and labour market characteristics at each time. The
dependent variable takes value one if the person is employed at that period. Otherwise,
it takes value 0. The covariates for the estimation of ( ̂PEmplo) in the analysis of the
timing to get married are the following:19 regions (NW, NE, CMadrid, C, E, Canaries),
Siblings, DivPar, education level (E2, E3Voc and E3GrPo, with omitted E1 ), Religious,
WorkTaste, cohorts, Schm6, Emplo6, Unemrf6 and Tempf6. Lag variables of 12 months
instead of 6 months are used in the analysis of timing to give birth. There are also other
demographic variables such as the age of marriage (AgeMa) as well as the partner’s edu-
cation.
The parameters of this probit estimation permit calculation of the individual probability
of being employed each time: ̂PEmplo = f(βˆx).
For explanatory purposes, we rewrite the previous equation as:̂PEmplo = f(βˆx+ βˆeEmplo6 + βˆuUnemrf6) (11)
where x is the vector of all explanatory variables except Emplo6 and Unemrf6. This
result is used as a variable in the estimation of the structural form.
7.1 Structural Form
The estimation of the exit rate in structural form incorporates ̂PEmplo as explanatory
variable, together with many other covariates (x).
hs(t|x, ̂PEmplo) = h0(t)exp(αx+ γ ̂PEmplo) (12)
The estimation of ̂PEmplo and hs share all variables except two (Emplo6 and Unemrf6 )
that we use to identify the equation. By doing this, we consider that both of these
covariates affect the hazard only indirectly through its effect on the chances of being
employed at each time ( ̂PEmplo). This is of interest since it allows us to distinguish
between the direct and indirect effect (through their influence on ̂PEmplo) of the different
variables. The Reduced form will only give the net effect of the two.
7.2 Reduced Form
Rather than introducing directly the variable ̂PEmplo into the estimation, the reduced
form estimates a model that uses as explanatory variables those elements who determinêPEmplo.
hr(t|x,Emplo6, Unemrf6) = h0(t)exp(δx+ δeEmplo6 + δuUnemrf6) (13)
Thus, the parameters of these variables provide joint net information about their direct
and indirect impact on the hazard. For example, we may have that higher education is
19The description of each variable is done in Section 4 and in Appendix A.
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related to higher exit in the estimation of the structural form (αˆe > 0) but the opposite
in the reduced form (δˆe < 0). This means that higher level of education is negative in the
reduced form estimation through its impact on the expectation of being employed, with
γˆe < 0. Once we control for it, higher education actually increases the chances of giving
birth. Note that δˆe ≈ αˆe+ γˆeβˆe. In this example, the negative indirect effect of education
on the exit rate offsets the direct and positive one, giving a negative sign in the reduced
form estimation.
Thus, the model is estimated under the reduced and structural form for the two cohorts.
8 Main Results
The explanatory variables are the same in the estimation of both old and young cohort,
except for Tempf6, which tells the percentage of female employees with a temporary con-
tract at national level for each period. This covariate is only present in the estimation
for the young cohort. The reason is that these contracts only exist from 1984 onwards.
Therefore, the majority of people in the old cohort have a zero value, making this vari-
able meaningfulness. Once the variable is removed, the sign and significance of the rest
of the variables is not modified, their coefficients slightly change and the comparison between
the two groups is fair.
In none of the estimations do common variables between reduced and structural form
change sign, so both direct and net effect discussed in Section 7 go in the same direction.
Tables 3, 4, 5 and 6 report both the coefficient and the hazard ratio for the Reduced
model. Analogous tables for the Structural form are in Tables 12, 13, 14 and 15 in Ap-
pendix B. Exponentiated individual coefficients have the interpretation of the ratio of the
hazards for a one-unit change in the corresponding covariate. For example, if the coef-
ficient on variable 1-if-religious is 1.26, then religious women face a hazard 26% greater
than non-religious and the hazard ratio=exp(coefficient of estimation) is 1.26.
In Section 6.2 we discussed the concern about the fact that the length of the history
is longer in the old cohort, which causes the number of censored observations to be pro-
portionally greater in the young cohort. Although the estimation takes this issue into
account, one would like to check if the disparity in period of observation leads to different
conclusions. This is why we have redone the estimations for the old cohort following these
individuals only up to 1980 (which makes the path equivalent to the young cohort). Re-
sults from the estimation for the old cohort show that the coefficients are not significantly
different from each other when applying the ‘normal’20 and the ‘artificial’ specification
in the timing to marriage, first and second child. However, some of the estimates are
significantly different in the estimation of the timing to the third child.21 Fortunately, as
we will explain later, results in the ‘artificial’ estimation do not contradict our statements.
When different from the ‘normal’ estimation (only in the timing towards the third child),
20We call ‘normal’ specification the one that uses all available information (up to 1995). The ‘artificial’
specification is the one that makes the fiction of observing the old cohort only up to 1980.
21This is expected since it is in this state where the two observed periods fall more apart.
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conclusions drawn from the ‘normal’ estimation are reinforced rather than reversed.
8.1 Female Sample Analysis
8.1.1 Timing to Marriage
Table 3: Timing to Marriage
Cohort 1945–60 Cohort 1961–77
Variables
Coefficient Haz. Ratio Coefficient Haz. Ratio
NW -0.162 (0.127) 0.850 -0.039 (0.136) 0.962
Regions NE -0.065 (0.118) 0.937 -0.342∗∗ (0.129) 0.710
Omitted CMadrid -0.037∗ (0.116) 0.963 -0.225 (0.134) 0.799
Category C -0.024 (0.111) 0.977 0.079 (0.109) 1.082
is S E 0.016 (0.099) 1.016 -0.113 (0.101) 0.893
Canaries 0.244 (0.175) 1.276 0.080 (0.163) 1.083
Siblings 0.009 (0.013) 1.009 0.016 (0.015) 1.016
DivPar Yes=1 -0.101 (0.202) 0.904 0.124 (0.143) 1.132
Religious Yes=1 0.232∗∗ (0.101) 1.261 0.281∗∗ (0.087) 1.324
WorkTaste Yes=1 0.083 (0.073) 1.087 -0.281∗∗ (0.071) 0.755
Female E2 -0.067 (0.069) 0.935 -0.262∗∗ (0.079) 0.769
Education E3Voc -0.218∗ (0.134) 0.804 -0.380∗∗ (0.138) 0.684
Omitted E1 E3GrPo -0.028∗∗ (0.177) 0.975 -0.462∗∗ (0.144) 0.630
Schm6 Yes=1 -0.733∗∗ (0.148) 0.480 -1.355∗∗ (0.113) 0.258
Emplo6 Yes=1 -0.190∗∗ (0.073) 0.827 0.240∗∗ (0.071) 1.271
Unemrf6 -0.031∗∗ (0.008) 0.969 -0.012∗∗ (0.006) 0.989
Tempf6 -0.009∗ (0.005) 0.991
Cohorts 1950–54 0.037 (0.088) 1.037
Omitted 1945–49 and 1955–60 0.451∗∗ (0.109) 1.570
1961–65 for Old and 1966–70 -0.038 (0.105) 0.962
Young respectively 1971–77 -0.220 (0.187) 0.803
Log likelihood -6657.6 -7148.8
N subjects 1150 2228
N observations 133006 214516
∗Significant at 10% level.
∗∗Significant at 5% level.
1Standard errors in brackets.
Table 3 shows the results from the hazard of marriage. Our regional dummies suggest that
a female from S (South: Andaluc´ia and Murcia)22 is slightly more likely to get married
in the next month compared to other areas, except for Canaries. However, this negative
22The definition of the regional categorical variables is done in Section 4.
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effect is only significant for NE in Cohort 1945–60. These differences in regions are in
line with the fact that the South of Spain is the most traditional area of the country, with
prevalence for marriage.
Individual social background is captured by the following variables: Siblings, DivPar
and Religious. Neither the number of siblings nor the fact of having divorced parents are
significant determinants of the hazard rate. However, a religious woman has a hazard
rate 26% greater than a non-religious at any time in the old cohort and 32% greater in
the young cohort.
Education level has a different behaviour in both cohorts. In Cohort 1945–60, higher
levels of education influence the hazard negatively, but the coefficients are only significant
at 10% for E3Voc. On the other hand, higher education is strongly significant at all levels
in Cohort 1961–77. For instance, at each time and controlling for the other variables, a
woman with a graduate or post-graduate degree has an exit rate which is 37% lower than
that of somebody who only achieved primary school. Thus, education has much greater
negative impact on the exit rate in the young cohort.
Another variable that has a strong and significant negative impact on the exit rate to
marriage is the dummy that reports at each time if the individual was or not at school
six months before (Schm6 ) the period under consideration. In Cohort 1945–60, a woman
who was enrolled in education six months before, has an exit rate around 48% that of a
woman who was not. In Cohort 1961–77, this negative effect is even greater with a hazard
ratio of 0.26. This is not surprising since students are unable to live independently due
to the lack of own resources.
Taste for work is not significant in Cohort 1945–60 but it impacts negatively in Cohort
1961–77. The covariate that specifies at each time if the individual was employed or not
six months before (Emplo6 ) has a totally different effect on the hazard in the two cohorts.
In Cohort 1945–60, this variable has a negative and significant effect on the exit rate, with
a hazard rate equal to 0.83. By contrast, this variable has a positive and significant effect
on the hazard in Cohort 1961–77, with a hazard rate equal to 1.27. That is, old-cohort
employed women (lagged six months) have less chances of marrying in the next month
at all times. In the young cohort, to be employed increases substantially the chances
of getting married. Baiza´n et al. (2001) find that being employed reduces the intensity
of marriage in their sample. However, they do not distinguish between the two cohorts
and apparently the effect of the old cohort seem to prevail if the whole group is merged.
The advantage of our study is that i t  allows us to analyse whether some variables have a
different impact in family formation in these two well-defined groups. Theory predicts
opposite effects of women in employment on marriage. On the one hand, one might expect
a positive coefficient since female employment actually increases economic resources that
are needed to form a family. On the other hand, it might have a negative effect, especially
in more traditional societies, if employment means female independence. Our results show
evidence that the former (positive) prediction might be valid for Cohort 1961–77 whereas
the latter (negative) prediction might be applied to Cohort 1945–60. This could imply a
change of mentality in the Spanish society. In the old times, the main target of a woman
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was to get married and they abandoned their job prospect in order to do it (employment
was a signal of self-reliance and was conceived as a ‘bad’ characteristic for marriage).
Nowadays, women study further and they want to develop a job career. Thus, they do
not marry before they are settled in the labour market. Simultaneously, there has also
been a generalised increase in the demand for a high standard of living and an increase
in housing costs, which makes the salary of the woman necessary as a source of income in
the household. This agrees with the view that female employment is required to leave the
parental home since it increases resources available and, consequently affects positively
the hazard of marriage. We would also like to point out that the dummy Emplo6 might
be capturing different effects in the two age groups. The old cohort is characterised by
lower unemployment rates around union formation compared to their young cohort coun-
terparts.23 This means that non-employment (i.e. Emplo6=0) in Cohort 1945–60 is more
likely to refer to inactivity, whereas non-employment in Cohort 1961–77 entails both un-
employment and inactivity. The latter might contribute in explaining the opposite sign
since in the young cohort there might be not only a choice option but also an economic
issue.
The Structural form estimation informs about how the six-month in advance forecast
of being employed affects the hazard. This variable is estimated to influence negatively
in the old cohort and positively in the young one. This means that the higher the
expectancies of working in six months time, the smaller is the probability of marrying
next month in the old cohort and, the greater is this probability in the young one.
Regional female unemployment rates (Unemrf6 ) describe the labour market risks and
opportunities. We would expect this variable to reduce the likelihood of marriage. The
coefficient for this estimate is negative and significant for both cohorts. For example,
an increase of one percentage point in the female unemployment rate reduces the hazard
rate by 1.1% in Cohort 1961–77. This shows evidence that the more unstable the labour
market, the lower the chances a woman will marry in the next month. Another poten-
tial reason why the Spanish marry so late is the lack of job security. The latter aspect
is enforced with the variable that reveals the percentage of female employees that work
on temporary contracts (Tempf6 ). This covariate is negative and significant. That is,
the greater the proportion of women working on temporary contracts, the smaller is the
probability of marriage.
We also control for five-year cohort bands. In our old cohort estimation, women born
between 1955–1960 are more likely to exit into marriage. In our young cohort, latter gen-
erations reduce the intensity of the hazard, although the coefficients are not significant.
23
Table 4: Timing to 1st Child
Cohort 1945–60 Cohort 1961–77
Variables
Coefficient Haz. Ratio Coefficient Haz. Ratio
NW -0.043 (0.132) 0.958 -0.437∗∗ (0.159) 0.646
Regions NE -0.017 (0.124) 0.983 -0.335∗∗ (0.156) 0.715
Omitted CMadrid 0.028 (0.121) 1.028 -0.478∗∗ (0.157) 0.620
Category C 0.201∗ (0.114) 1.222 -0.135 (0.125) 0.874
is S E -0.118 (0.105) 0.889 -0.402∗∗ (0.118) 0.669
Canaries 0.092 (0.183) 1.096 -0.044 (0.181) 0.957
Siblings 0.034∗∗ (0.014) 1.035 -0.001 (0.017) 0.999
DivPar Yes=1 -0.138 (0.212) 0.871 -0.005 (0.108) 0.995
Religious Yes=1 0.006 (0.106) 1.006 0.274∗∗ (0.105) 0.315
AgeMa -0.009 (0.014) 0.991 -0.062 (0.022) 0.940
WorkTaste Yes=1 -0.007 (0.070) 0.993 -0.276∗∗ (0.092) 0.759
Female E2 -0.033 (0.070) 0.967 -0.105 (0.099) 0.900
Education E3Voc 0.206 (0.152) 1.288 -0.416∗∗ (0.184) 0.659
Omitted E1 E3GrPo -0.207 (0.151) 0.813 -0.429∗∗ (0.203) 0.651
Partner E2P -0.071 (0.141) 0.932 -0.045 (0.229) 0.956
Education E3VocP -0.006 (0.199) 0.994 0.079 (0.334) 1.082
Omitted E1P E3GrPoP -0.313∗ (0.182) 0.731 0.049 (0.257) 1.050
Schm12 Yes=1 -0.136 (0.177) 0.873 -0.028 (0.145) 0.972
Emplo12 Yes=1 -0.187∗∗ (0.070) 0.829 -0.158∗∗ (0.076) 0.854
Unemrf12 -0.008 (0.007) 0.992 -0.012∗ (0.007) 0.988
Tempf12 0.001 (0.005) 1.001
Cohorts 1950–54 -0.027 (0.092) 0.973
Omitted 1945–49 and 1955–60 0.034 (0.117) 1.034
Cohort 1961–65 for Old and 1966–70 -0.211 (0.115) 0.810
Young respectively 1971–77 0.158 (0.245) 1.172
Log likelihood -6103.6 -4958.4
N subjects 1041 1024
N observations 26176 25452
∗Significant at 10% level.
∗∗Significant at 5% level.
1Standard errors in brackets.
8.1.2 Timing to First Child
Table 4 shows that region does not have a significant effect on the probability of having
a first child in the next month in Cohort 1945–60. However, it has an impact on Cohort
23The proportion of women employed, unemployed and inactive has changed substantially since 1970.
For example, 22% married women aged 20–30 were employed in 1977, 1% were unemployed and 77%
were inactive. In 1987, the rates were 30%, 13% and 57%, respectively. In 1997, the proportions were
40%, 20% and 40%.
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1961–77, where all regions have a lower probability of exiting relative to the S. NW, NE,
CMadrid and E have a significant coefficient. This is again probably due to the fact
that the South has remained more traditional and people might be using less effective
contraceptive methods. Data from the sample seem to corroborate this hypothesis. For
example, without differentiating among regions, 71% of women took contraceptive pre-
cautions in their first complete intercourse in the young cohort. However, 63% did so in
the South. By contrast, 75% took precautions in the East and 82% in the North East.
The equivalent percentages were much lower in the old cohort with an overall of 35%
using contraceptive methods in the first intercourse. In the South, the percentage was
26% and in the East and North East was 47% and 32% respectively.
The number of siblings increases significantly the hazard of first child in Cohort 1945–60.
Parents separation has no impact in either of the two cohorts.24 Finally, Religious is
positive in both cohorts although it is only significant in the young cohort. In the latter
group, a woman who defines herself as religious has a hazard rate 32% greater than a
woman who does not. Nowadays, being religious seems to create more disparity among
people. That is, those who define themselves as religious do indeed subscribe to a partic-
ular ideology. In the old cohort, people (religious or not) were more generally influenced
by the traditional society and the fact of calling themselves religious did not imply that
they were more likely to follow traditional patterns of behaviour than the remainder.
Demography foresees that age of marriage is negative related to the timing of the first
child. Our results partly corroborate this expectation since we obtain negative (although
insignificant) signs. In the old cohort, an extra year on the age of marriage has a hazard
ratio of 0.99. That is, each year delaying the marriage reduces the exit rate by 1% (ceteris
paribus). In the young cohort, the ratio is 0.94.
Female education is strongly linked to fertility trajectory. Some authors find that higher
values of education tend to delay the onset of childbearing and then compress the span of
births into fewer years (Hoem and Hoem (1989)). If a woman has achieved a graduate or
postgraduate degree, she owns a high value in the labour market. This increases her op-
portunity cost of building a family since having a child implies taking some time off. The
awareness of this opportunity cost is augmented if the labour market is neither promising
(i.e. high unemployment rates) nor flexible, which enlarges women’s professional career
risk aversion of motherhood. Once a woman has a first child, theory suggests that a high-
educated woman will have a shorter spell towards the second child. The reason is that
they compress the births when it is optimal for their professional life. This theory is
only confirmed in our young cohort. While a higher education level is not significant in
Cohort 1945–60, it has a negative and significant impact on the probability to have a first
child next month in Cohort 1961–77. For example, a woman with an undergraduate or
postgraduate degree has a hazard rate that is 65% of that of a woman with a primary de-
gree. This shows evidence that the opportunity cost increases with the level of education,
particularly when females are more attached to the labour force (i.e. Cohort 1961–77 ).
Educational enrolment lagged twelve months is not significant since most women get
24Notice that the number of disruptions in Spain in the period covered is still rather low (2% in the
old cohort and 4% in the young one).
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married once they have abandoned education.
Being employed twelve months previously reduces the hazard of first child25 in both
cohorts, ceteris paribus. The hazard ratio is 0.83 and 0.85 for the old and young cohort
respectively. There are theoretical opinions that predict the impact of employment on
fertility in both directions. On the one hand, female employment raises resources and
should increase the likelihood of first child. On the other hand, employed women find it
hard to combine work and family and they postpone childbearing. The latter is especially
true if policies that facilitate reconciliation between family and work are missing and if
there is both instability and inflexibility in the labour market. Our results suggest that
female employment is a brake on family formation in Spain. This has political implica-
tions for the Spanish government who could implement broader family-friendly policies.
In Section 7 we discussed the general concern about the endogeneity of fertility and labour
supply. In order to overcome it, we lag26 the employment covariate and we control for the
individuals’ work preferences with the variable WorkTaste.27 Those women with higher
preference for work are less likely to have a first child in the next month, being strongly
significant in the young cohort. We believe that this variable reduces the possibility that
the impact of employment status Emplo12 is misleading.
Intuition indicates that women who work part-time are more family oriented. This is
why the model was also estimated taking into account job status: i.e. part-time vs full-
time. The effect on the probability of having a child in the next month was found to
be similar under the two categories.28 Thus, there is evidence that a part-time job does
not contribute to making family and work more compatible. Recent work by De la Rica,
Ariza and Ugidos (2002) using the European Community Household Panel (ECHP) find
that part-time (compared to full-time) does not increase intensities of Spanish first birth.
This is due to the fact that part-time jobs are not common in Spain and in any case they
are typically not based on a voluntary decision. The percentages of part-time jobs vary
a lot in Europe. Greece, Portugal, Italy, Ireland and Spain are those EU countries where
this typology is less frequently used. By contrast, in the North and Centre of Europe they
are much more prevalent. In the latter group, the government’s intervention to reconcile
family and work, rather than the production structure, has favoured the development
of part-time jobs (Consejo Econo´mico y Social (1996)). Moreover, among those coun-
tries where part-time jobs are most frequent (e.g. Great Britain and the Netherlands),
most people who work part-time prefer this to full-time work (e.g. Nickell and Van Ours
25This result is consistent with other empirical studies (for example, Kalwij (2000) for the Netherlands,
Hoem and Hoem (1989) for Sweden and Harvey (1996) for the US). They find that fertility is negative
related to labour force participation.
26We also lag employment 18 and 24 months to exclude the possibility of home-oriented women leaving
employment far before the birth, which will reverse the causality. We find that our employment covariate
lagged 18 is negative and significant in both cohorts. The employment covariate lagged 24 reduces the
hazard to first child but it is not significant. We believe that there is evidence for employment causing
postponement of fertility since employment status far ahead from the birth date affects negatively the
hazard.
27The preference for work is a dummy value that equals 1 if the individual is working one year after
completing school.
28Since we found no significant difference between part and full-time we decided to merge them into
one single category (employed).
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(2000)). We would expect to find that these two job statuses influence differently the
chances of childbearing in countries with more flexibility in working hours. De la Rica
et al. (2002) compares the effect of working status on first birth in Great Britain, the
Netherlands, Ireland and Spain. They find evidence that Spain is the country with the
most part-time negative effect on fertility.
Theory by Becker (1960) predicts that the husbands’ income should impact positively
on fertility. Ariza and Ugidos (2002) estimate the timing of first birth in Spain with
‘Encuesta Continua de Presupuestos Familiares’ (Spanish Household Survey Panel Data).
They find that partner’s income affects positively the hazard. Income information is miss-
ing in our data and we use husbands’ education as a proxy since one expects that higher
education is linked to higher wage. Results from the estimation show that this variable
is not significant for first birth.
Female regional unemployment rates have a negative effect on the timing to the first
birth, with significance in the young cohort. An increase of one percentage point in fe-
male unemployment in a particular region in Cohort 1961–77 reduces the hazard rate by
1.2%. Therefore, precarious labour market atmosphere is translated into fertility post-
ponement. However, even though the proportion of female temporary contracts had a
strong influence in the timing to marriage, it does not have an impact on first birth.
The Structural model shows that the forecast of being employed in twelve months time
generates a negative and significant sign in both cohorts. This suggests that combining
family and work does not seem a complementary task for Spanish mothers.
8.1.3 Timing To Second Child
In Table 5 we observe generalised evidence that women who live out of the South have
a smaller hazard rate of having a second child. Both the number of siblings and parents
divorced are not significant. Neither is religion.
Demographic explanations are captured by the age at first child and the spell from mar-
riage to first child. There is the generalised view among demographic papers that variables
such as the timing of marriage and the lengths of prior births spells impact strongly on
the spacing of subsequent births. However, Heckman et al. (1985) show that these de-
mographic explanations are not valid in the timing to a second child once they control
for unobserved heterogeneity in a parametric specification of the hazard. We find similar
results to theirs. In the young cohort, there is evidence that neither of the two is signifi-
cant. In the old cohort, only the duration between marriage and first child is. An extra
year implies a reduction of the hazard rate by 16%.
A high level of female education has been related to faster timing to the second child (e.g.
Hoem and Hoem (1989)) because those women try to compress the time spent out of the
labour market.29 This prediction is fulfilled in Cohort 1945–60, where the coefficients are
positive although only significant among women with a vocational degree. The pattern is
29Other authors find that education affects negatively the hazard rate in all births.
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Table 5: Timing to 2nd Child
Cohort 1945–60 Cohort 1961–77
Variables
Coefficient Haz. Ratio Coefficient Haz. Ratio
NW -0.465∗∗ (0.152) 0.628 -0.560∗∗ (0.244) 0.571
Regions NE -0.469∗∗ (0.138) 0.626 -0.089 (0.219) 0.914
Omitted CMadrid -0.180∗∗ (0.132) 0.835 -0.571 (0.238) 0.565
Category C -0.192 (0.125) 0.825 -0.388∗∗ (0.167) 0.678
is S E -0.283∗∗ (0.115) 0.754 -0.376∗∗ (0.171) 0.687
Canaries -0.149 (0.194) 0.862 -0.400 (0.260) 0.670
Siblings 0.020 (0.014) 1.020 0.031 (0.023) 1.031
DivPar Yes=1 -0.034 (0.233) 0.967 -0.013 (0.141) 0.987
Religious Yes=1 0.105 (0.125) 1.111 0.083 (0.153) 1.087
AgeAt1C -0.014 (0.011) 0.986 0.017 (0.031) 1.017
MenT1C -0.176∗∗ (0.031) 0.839 -0.051 (0.046) 0.950
Girl Yes=1 -0.003 (0.073) 0.997 -0.133 (0.099) 0.875
WorkTaste Yes=1 0.013 (0.073) 1.013 -0.080 (0.104) 0.923
Female E2 0.119 (0.081) 1.126 -0.296∗∗ (0.124) 0.744
Education E3Voc 0.385∗∗ (0.168) 1.469 -0.056 (0.254) 0.945
Omitted E1 E3GrPo 0.074 (0.207) 1.077 0.509∗ (0.271) 1.663
Partner E2P 0.051 (0.147) 1.053 -0.050 (0.284) 0.951
Education E3VocP 0.006 (0.222) 1.006 -0.046 (0.395) 0.955
Omitted E1 E3GrPoP 0.117 (0.199) 1.124 0.110 (0.328) 1.116
Schm12 Yes=1 -0.261 (0.275) 0.770 -0.434 (0.370) 0.648
Emplo12 Yes=1 -0.321∗∗ (0.083) 0.726 -0.208∗ (0.107) 0.812
Unemrf12 -0.007 (0.007) 0.993 -0.019∗ (0.010) 0.989
Tempf12 -0.008 (0.007) 0.992
Cohorts 1950–54 -0.065 (0.107) 0.937
Omitted 1945–49 and 1955–60 -0.165 (0.143) 0.848
1961–65 for Old and 1966–70 -0.059 (0.173) 0.942
Young respectively 1971–77 -0.216 (0.349) 0.806
Log likelihood -5220.4 2519.0
N subjects 1007 821
N observations 58893 36986
∗Significant at 10% level.
∗∗Significant at 5% level.
1Standard errors in brackets.
different in Cohort 1961–77. Those women who finished with a secondary degree have
a negative and significant coefficient, and their exit rate is 26% smaller than the exit rate
of a woman who only got the primary degree. Women with a vocational degree have a
non-significant negative coefficient. By contrast, those women who obtained a graduate or
post-graduate degree have greater chances to have a second child in the following month,
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compared to somebody with a primary degree. The coefficient is positive and significant
with a hazard ratio of 1.66. Thus the theory is confirmed for those women who have a
university degree. They will compress the spell between the first two births. This does not
imply that women with a graduate or post-graduate degree have more children than those
with only primary school. The result means that women with a university degree that had
a first child are more likely to have a second child faster. These are a special sub-group
among graduate women whose jobs and personality allowed themselves to have a first child
and then, they are likely to have a second child. As the human capital theory predicts,
they try to have the second child quicker in order to compress the time spent off their jobs.
To be employed twelve months before reduces the likelihood of having a second child
in the next month in both cohorts. The hazard ratios are 0.73 and 0.81 for the old and
young cohort respectively. Similarly to the timing of first birth, there were no significant
differences between part and full-time. Thus, employment is a constraint to expand the
family, even after controlling for taste for work. The same reasons applied to first birth (i.e.
labour market flexibility, regulations and child-care provisions) can be applied to second
birth.
Labour market situation is measured by regional female unemployment rates and the
proportion of female fixed-term contracts. In the two cohorts, the higher the unemploy-
ment is, the less chances to have a second child in the following month. This is particularly
the case in Cohort 1961–77 where the hazard ratio is 0.989, which means that an increase
of one percentage point in regional female unemployment rates reduces the hazard by
1.1%. The impact of fixed-term contracts on second birth, although negative, is non-
significant.
Despite the fact that high levels of the husband’s education (proxy for income) are foreseen
to reduce the time to a second child, our results do not support this theory. Coefficients
appear to be insignificant.
The information given by the Structural form is that the expectation of being employed
is negatively related to the hazard rate, which suggests lack of compatibility between
fertility and female participation.
8.1.4  Timing to Third Child
Table 6 shows that in general those living in the South have a greater probability of hav-
ing a third child in the next months. The number of siblings increases the hazard rate
significantly in Cohort 1945–60. Neither divorced parents nor religion are significant.
Previous literature (e.g. Harvey (1996)) found that demographic variables have a ma-
jor role in the timing to the third child as long as employment and education are less
important. Our results are in line with theirs since both coefficients of the age at second
child and the spell from the first child to the second child are negative and significant.
For instance, the hazard ratios for the birth interval are 0.81 and 0.79 for the old and
young cohort respectively. That is, an extra year in the spell first to second child reduces
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the hazard by 19% in Cohort 1945–60.
We find that there exists a significant preference for boys in Cohort 1945–60. Couples
with two girls have a probability to have a third child 38% greater than couples with one
or two boys. The dummy for boys is not significant in any of the cohorts. This corrobo-
rates a predilection for boys and not for variety of sexes in the old group. It seems that
in Cohort 1961–77, the sex of the children is minor in the decision to have a third child.
High levels of education, especially at graduate and post-graduate level, strongly decrease
the exit rate for both cohorts. This shows evidence that graduate parity two women
choose the two-child norm. That is, those graduates who have children prefer indeed to
discontinue childbearing after the second birth.
Lagged employment status is negative but not significant. This means that at parity
two other factors (i.e. education, region and demographic covariates) rather than em-
ployment are more crucial in determining the probability of a third pregnancy. The
precarious labour market plays a minor role on the exit rates. (female unemployment
rates impact negatively but are insignificant). Therefore, labour markets and employ-
ment mainly affect fertility at earlier parities.
Once more we do not find evidence that partner’s education increases the hazard rate,
which is contra-intuitive. This could be due to the fact that partner’s education is actually
not capturing the income effect. Notice also (as explained in Section 4) that this variable
is taken at the interview’s date and it is an approximation.
Being born in later cohorts reduces the intensity of a third birth, ceteris paribus. Cohort
effects only play a role in second parity.
Some of the coefficients in the ‘artificial’ estimation for the old cohort are significantly
different from the ‘normal’ estimation. However, they do not affect the nature of our
conclusions. Coefficients that were significant under the ‘normal’ specification still are
under the ‘artificial’ one and they do not change sign.
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Table 6: Timing to 3rd Child
Cohort 1945–60 Cohort 1961–77
Variables
Coefficient Haz. Ratio Coefficient Haz. Ratio
NW -0.782∗∗ (0.250) 0.458 -1.892∗∗ (0.752) 0.151
Regions NE -0.474∗∗ (0.227) 0.622 0.148 (0.457) 1.160
Omitted CMadrid -0.733∗∗ (0.216) 0.481 -1.033 (0.698) 0.356
Category C -0.309∗ (0.183) 0.734 0.206 (0.367) 1.229
is S E -0.527∗∗ (0.175) 0.590 -0.482 (0.400) 0.617
Canaries 0.074 (0.263) 1.077 0.262 (0.660) 1.300
Siblings 0.052∗∗ (0.021) 1.054 0.004 (0.051) 1.004
DivPar Yes=1 -0.124 (0.358) 0.884 -0.507 (0.455) 0.602
Religious Yes=1 -0.253 (0.206) 0.776 0.378 (0.427) 1.459
AgeAt2C -0.081∗ (0.024) 0.992 -0.109∗∗ (0.063) 0.897
MenT2C -0.210∗ (0.043) 0.811 -0.239∗∗ (0.100) 0.787
TwoGirls Yes=1 0.324∗∗ (0.154) 1.383 0.467 (0.306) 1.594
TwoBoys Yes=1 -0.045 (0.127) 0.956 0.323 (0.291) 1.381
WorkTaste Yes=1 0.194∗∗ (0.117) 1.214 0.180 (0.271) 1.197
Female E2 -0.148 (0.132) 0.862 -0.721∗∗ (0.290) 0.486
Education E3Voc -0.545∗∗ (0.310) 0.580 0.520 (0.615) 1.682
Omitted E1 E3GrPo -0.021 (0.387) 0.980 -1.843∗∗ (1.135) 0.158
Partner E2P -0.415∗∗ (0.195) 0.661 0.026 (0.633) 1.026
Education E3VocP -0.120 (0.344) 0.887 -0.931 (1.039) 0.394
Omitted E1 E3GrPoP -0.093 (0.299) 0.911 0.901 (0.748) 2.461
Schm12 Yes=1 0.211 (0.432) 1.235 0.542 (0.654) 1.719
Emplo12 Yes=1 -0.213 (0.150) 0.808 -0.293 (0.330) 0.746
Unemrf12 -0.015 (0.011) 0.985 -0.036 (0.025) 0.965
Tempf12 0.001 (0.016) 1.001
Cohorts 1950–54 -0.353∗∗ (0.160) 0.703
Omitted 1945–49 and 1955–60 -0.450∗∗ (0.224) 0.638
1961–65 for Old and 1966–77 -0.705 (0.473) 0.494
Young respectively
Log likelihood -2014.6 -374.3
N subjects 824 436
N observations 78561 28289
∗Significant at 10% level.
∗∗Significant at 5% level.
1Standard errors in brackets.
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8.2  Male Sample Analysis
Up to now the paper deals with the decision to marry and have children from the women’s
perspective, controlling for their social and labour market characteristics. Note that part-
ner’s information is scarce since we can only account for their education. The reason is
that there is no retrospective records about partner’s characteristics in the female sample.
We are aware that men’s contribution to the drop in fertility should be further explored.
That is, it is not only women’s labour market situation but also men’s that has caused
the decline in fertility in Spain. The increase in unemployment rates and temporary con-
tracts has occurred in both sexes. Theory forecasts a negative relationship between male
unemployment and fertility.
Since the FFS survey was also undertaken for a sample of men, it is worth analysing their
family formation. Unfortunately, the size of the sample is smaller (there are 1992 com-
pleted interviews compared to 4021 we had for women), which makes only reasonable the
estimation up to first child. We proceed as in the female study by splitting the estima-
tion into two cohorts: Cohort 1945–60 and 1961–77. Our variables are practically the
same except for the fact that we do not include TasteWork.30 Accordingly, we control
for male regional unemployment rates and the proportion of total male contracts that are
temporary.
Table 7: Number of Subjects in Male’s Sample
Cohort 1945–60 Cohort 1961–77
Marriage 1st Birth Marriage 1st Birth
Total 784 639 1204 374
Exits 676 614 396 267
Censored 108 25 808 107
8.2.1 Timing to Marriage
Results in Table 8 show that the main determinants of marriage in Cohort 1945–60 31 are
the fact of being at school, which increases the duration to marriage, and being employed,
which reduces it.32 An individual who is employed has a probability of exit to marriage
in the next month twice as large the probability of an individual who is not. Being en-
rolled in education decreases the hazard by 53%. Regional unemployment rates are not
30As discussed by Angrist and Evans (1998) and Ahn and Mira (2001), male employment is certainly
exogenous in fertility choices. Consequently, we do not need to deal with corrections for potential endo-
geneity between participation and fertility as we did for our female’s sample.
31The estimation has been also done with the fiction of censoring individuals in 1980 so as to make it
comparable to Cohort 1961–77 in terms of censoring. The target of this exercise is to check if the estimates
are significantly different under both specifications (old cohort and ’artificial’ old cohort). Results show
that they are not, which means that one can rely more on the description and comparison of both old
and young cohort.
32Both variables are lagged six months.
32
Table 8: Timing to Marriage
Cohort 1945–60 Cohort 1961–77
Variables
Coefficient Hazard Ratio Coefficient Hazard Ratio
NW -0.186 (0.159) 0.830 -0.042 (0.241) 0.958
Regions NE -0.458∗ (0.167) 0.632 -0.534∗∗ (0.263) 0.586
Omitted CMadrid -0.223 (0.178) 0.800 -0.433∗∗ (0.255) 0.649
Category C -0.379∗∗ (0.152) 0.684 -0.270 (0.210) 0.764
is S E -0.039 (0.127) 0.962 -0.225 (0.191) 1.253
Canaries 0.140 (0.239) 1.150 0.233 (0.177) 1.262
Siblings 0.0004 (0.017) 1.0004 0.073∗∗ (0.024) 1.075
DivPar Yes=1 -0.076 (0.127) 0.927 -0.005 (0.149) 0.995
Religious Yes=1 0.153∗∗ (0.085) 1.165 0.398∗∗ (0.108) 1.488
Female E2 0.034 (0.093) 1.035 -0.167 (0.136) 0.846
Education E3Voc -0.031 (0.190) 0.969 0.163 (0.272) 1.177
Omitted E1 E3GrPo 0.073 (0.152) 1.076 -0.691∗∗ (0.256) 0.501
Schm6 Yes=1 -0.753∗∗ (0.206) 0.471 -1.113∗∗ (0.238) 0.329
Emplo6 Yes=1 0.927∗∗ (0.139) 2.527 0.472∗∗ (0.139) 1.603
Unemrm6 -0.009 (0.009) 0.990 -0.019 (0.013) 0.981
Tempm6 -0.013 (0.011) 0.988
Cohorts 1950–54 0.240∗∗ (0.110) 1.272
Omitted 1945–49 and 1955–60 0.272∗∗ (0.144) 1.312
1961–65 for Old and 1966–70 -0.124 (0.176) 0.884
Young respectively 1971–77 -0.152 (0.349) 0.859
Log likelihood -3980.93 -2350.3
N subjects 784 1204
N observations 121438 131938
∗Significant at 10% level.
∗∗Significant at 5% level.
1Standard errors in brackets.
significant. Neither is the education level. Religion increases the hazard by 16%.
In Cohort 1961–77, a man with a graduate or postgraduate degree has an exit rate that
is 50% smaller than the one of someone with only a primary degree. Enrolment in ed-
ucation reduces the hazard of marriage by 67%. A religious person has a probability of
exit to marriage 49% greater than a non-religious one.33 Employed men have an exit rate
much greater than non-employed men. Both the regional unemployment rates and the
proportion of temporary contracts negatively affect the hazard rate but their coefficients
are not significant. The worsening of the male labour market has partly contributed to
33Similar to women, religion seems to play a greater role in the young cohort. This may be due to
the fact that, in previous generations, everybody 'had' to be religious and follow the ’rules’ of society.
Nowadays, differences in behaviour between those who are or are  not religious are probably greater.
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the delay in marriage and, consequently, the postponement of births in the young cohort.
Our results suggest that unemployment at micro level (note that spells of non-employment
are highly related to unemployment in the male’s sample) rather than at macro level (un-
employment rates) is the main individual reason for postponing marriage. We therefore
observe that being employed is crucial for getting married in both cohorts. This is dif-
ferent from the female analysis in the old cohort. In that case, working women were less
likely to get married in the next month, ceteris paribus.
8.2.2 Timing to First Child
Table 9 shows that any region has a smaller exit rate to first birth relative to the South
in both cohorts. An extra year on age of marriage has no impact on the hazard in Cohort
1945–60 but it significantly reduces the intensity in Cohort 1961–77. In general, higher
levels of male education affect the hazard positively, although coefficients are not signif-
icant. In our female sample we obtained the reverse effect. It is interesting to observe
that partner’s education (which here implies female’s education) postpones significantly
first child in Cohort 61-77, which is in accordance with our finding in the female sample.
Surprisingly being employed does not increase the hazard of first birth. Regional unem-
ployment rates only affect negatively in the old cohort. It seems that the major impact of
economic indicators on fertility comes through their influence on the timing to marriage.
That is, non-employment partly causes the drop of fertility through the delay in marriage
and consequently, in births (since the age of marriage increases the duration to the birth
of the first child). Thus, spells of unemployment reduce indirectly fertility by postponing
marriage. These results are consistent with the paper by Ahn and Mira (2001). Although
they use a different survey with annual units of time, they also show that non-employment
spells reduce the probability of getting married. In their analysis, being employed has
a minor effect on births due to sample selection. Those who do not have jobs will not
marry, which means that they are not eligible for births. The same explanation can be
applied to our findings.
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Table 9: Timing to 1st Child
Cohort 1945–60 Cohort 1961–77
Variables
Coefficient Hazard Ratio Coefficient Hazard Ratio
NW -0.336∗∗ (0.166) 0.714 -0.448 (0.297) 0.639
Regions NE -0.308∗ (0.173) 0.735 -0.957∗∗ (0.349) 0.384
Omitted CMadrid -0.394∗∗ (0.195) 0.674 -0.514 (0.325) 0.598
Category C -0.125 (0.164) 0.883 -0.230 (0.263) 0.795
is S E -0.461∗∗ (0.137) 0.631∗∗ -0.799 (0.236) 0.450
Canaries -0.068 (0.256) 0.934 -1.237∗∗ (0.364) 0.290
Siblings 0.016 (0.018) 1.012 0.011 (0.033) 1.011
DivPar Yes=1 -0.072 (0.121) 0.931 -0.009 (0.305) 0.992
Religious Yes=1 0.078 (0.091) 1.081 0.166 (0.135) 1.181
AgeMa 0.015 (0.014) 1.015 -0.097∗∗ (0.041) 0.908
Male E2 0.0008 (0.104) 1.001 0.304 (0.395) 1.355
Education E3Voc -0.393∗ (0.212) 0.675 -0.852 (0.389) 1.729
Omitted E1 E3GrPo 0.103 (0.173) 1.109 0.379 (0.385) 1.461
Partner E2P 0.285∗ (0.172) 1.329 -0.584 (0.395) 0.558
Education E3VocP 0.106 (0.239) 1.112 -0.852∗ (0.520) 0.423
Omitted E1P E3GrPoP 0.020 (0.255) 1.021 -0.862∗ (0.473) 0.422
Schm12 Yes=1 0.438∗∗ (0.218) 1.550 0.280 (0.312) 1.324
Emplo12 Yes=1 0.180 (0.153) 1.197 -0.308∗ (0.182) 0.735
Unemrm12 -0.017∗ (0.009) 0.983 0.003 (0.016) 1.000
Tempm12 0.009 (0.013) 1.009
Cohorts 1950–54 0.135 (0.119) 1.145
Omitted 1945–49 and 1955–60 0.050 (0.151) 1.051
1961–65 for Old and 1966–70 -0.421∗∗ (0.210) 0.657
Young respectively 1971–77 -0.125 (0.429) 0.882
Log likelihood -3413.90 -1315.66
N subjects 639 374
N observations 17303 9130
∗Significant at 10% level.
∗∗Significant at 5% level.
1Standard errors in brackets.
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9 Conclusions
The aim of the paper is to analyse the effects of labour market instability, employment
status, education, social and demographic characteristics on the timing of family forma-
tion. Our motivation is to understand further the low fertility rate in Spain. We focus
on both female and male individuals and separate our sample into two different cohorts:
Cohort 1945–60 and Cohort 1961–77. We next summarise our main findings.
The labour market both at the individual and at the aggregate level is crucial for family
formation and its impact is different for men and women.
We have some evidence that the phenomenon of the late-leaving of the parental home
in Spain has been enforced by the unstable labour market, particularly from the woman’s
perspective. Whereas regional unemployment does not affect the timing of marriage and
first child for men, it significantly postpones both states for women. The increased pro-
portion of temporary contracts also reduces the likelihood of women marrying.
Employment at the individual level is a key factor for marriage. Men who are employed
marry faster in both cohorts. However, employed married men do not have a greater
probability of having a birth, ceteris paribus. Male employment accelerates family forma-
tion through increasing the likelihood of marriage.
Interestingly, a woman’s employment status has a different impact on the likelihood of
getting married in the two cohorts. While being employed has a negative impact on the
chances of marrying in Cohort 1945–60, it has a positive effect in Cohort 1961–77. One
explanation could be that the role of women in society has changed substantially. Before,
women left their jobs in order to build up a family. Nowadays, women wish to develop a
working career and do not marry until they are well settled in their job. Modern women
work both for personal development and economic reasons (caused by an increase in living
standards and housing prices). This view is supported by the fact that a taste for work
is not significant in the timing of marriage in the old group but it delays marriage in
the young cohort. A complementary reason is related to the meaning of individual non-
employment. Female unemployment rates have risen in the last two decades and were
very high when the young cohort was at the standard age of marriage. Thus, individual-
non-employment is more likely to imply inactivity in Cohort 1945–60 than in Cohort
1961–77. We expect this to have an effect on our estimates.
Married women who work postpone having their first child in both cohorts, ceteris paribus.
This is due to their greater opportunity cost of having children and the lack of facilities
to enable employed women to combine job and family. We find that working part-time
does not impact differently on our hazards since part-time work is hardly an option in
Spain (e.g. in 1987, 13.7% work part-time and one third of those involuntary). Thus, the
Spanish government may have a role in developing policies that help to reconcile fertility
and participation such as the provision of child-care or an increase in the flexibility of
working hours (i.e the voluntary choice of full vs part-time hours).
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Demographic factors rather than employment status are the main contributors in the
hazard of third child. In fact, age at second child and spell between first, together with
female’s education explain the timing of third birth. A similar result was found by Harvey
(1996). Interestingly, in the old cohort, the wish to have a boy in the family influences
positively the hazard to the third child.
Female employment status also affects negatively the chances of having a second child
in both cohorts for the same reasons. In the timing to the third child, this variable is
negative but not significant. Rather than being employed, other factors (especially demo-
graphic) are the main determinants of the chances of a third birth.
Becker (1960) suggests that a high level of education is linked to low fertility because
of the implied higher opportunity cost of having children. We find that education post-
pones marriage in Cohort 1961–77 and by delaying household formation it negatively
affects fertility. Furthermore, we observe that highly educated married women delay the
first birth, especially in Cohort 1961–77.
The impact of education on the timing of the second child is less clear-cut. In Cohort
1945–60, the coefficient of education in the hazard function is positive and significant
among those who have a vocational degree. It is interesting to notice that in Cohort 1961–
77, women with a graduate or post-graduate degree are far more likely to compress their
first and second child. This suggests that those graduate women who overcome the barrier
of first birth are faster to their second birth, compared to women with a primary degree.
The coefficient of education turns out to be negative in the estimation of the hazard rate
for the third child, which implies that graduate and post-graduate women who have
children prefer the so-called two-child norm.
Household income that is exogenous to women’s employment is expected to influence
positively the probability of expanding the family (Becker (1960)). We use partner’s ed-
ucation as a proxy. However, we do not find the predicted values. This could partly be
due to the fact that partner’s education is not accurate for accounting for external income.
Among our social background covariates, religion is the most important since it signifi-
cantly reduces the time to marriage for both men and women.
The stylised factors in Spain since the 70s are: a rise of female employment, an in-
crease of overall unemployment, a fall in male employment, a rise in temporary contracts
and an increase in education. In our analysis, we show that male employment reduces
the timing to marriage. Since male employment rates have fallen, we expect a decline
in fertility by delaying demographic processes. We observe that a rise in instability (i.e.
unemployment and temporary contracts) postpones female marriage, which in turn im-
pacts negatively on fertility. We also have evidence that female employment postpones
childbearing. Since female employment rates have risen since the 70s, we again expect a
drop in fertility. Simultaneously, we find that higher levels of female education postpones
marriage and first birth. Therefore, the growing years in female schooling also explains
the decline in family size. All these factors have contributed to the drop in fertility. If we
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would like to reverse the declining path in fertility, we need to accomplish three things:
first, we should reverse the impact of female employment on childbearing. The fact that
female employment postpones motherhood suggests that there is lack of reconciliation
between family and work. We believe that the government should introduce policies that fa-
cilitate the combination of participation and fertility. This can be achieved by increasing
both the availability of public child-care and flexibility of the number of hours in periods
of childcare. Second, we should reduce female instability in the labour market. Third, we
should implement policies to raise male employment.
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A Labels for the variables
Table 10: Variable Labels
E1 Dummy (1 if highest education is primary degree; omitted category)
E2 Dummy (1 if highest education is secondary degree)
E3Voc Dummy (1 if highest education is vocational tertiary degree)
E3GrPo Dummy (1 if highest education is university degree)
E1P Dummy (1 if partner’s highest education is primary degree; omitted)
E2P Dummy (1 if partner’s highest education is secondary degree)
E3VocP Dummy variable (1 if partner’s highest education is vocational degree)
E3GrPoP Dummy (1 if partner’s highest education is university degree)
Religious Dummy (1 if individual’s is religious)
Siblings Number of siblings
WorkTaste Dummy (1 if working one year after completing school)
DivPar Dummy (1 if parents divorced)
AgeMa Age of marriage
AgeAt1C Age at first child
AgeAt2C Age at second child
MenT1C Months between marriage and first child
MenT2C Months between first child and second child
Girl If first child was a girl
TwoGirls If both first and second children were girls
TwoBoys If both first and second children were boys
DivPar Dummy (1 if parents divorced)
Emplo12 Dummy (1 if employed 12 months ago)
Schm12 Dummy (1 if at school 12 months ago)
Unemrf12 Female regional unemployment rates 12 months ago
Tempf12 Female proportion of temporary contracts at national level 12 months ago
Unemrm12 Male regional unemployment rates 12 months ago
Tempm12 Male proportion of temporary contracts at national level 12 months ago
NW North-West region
NE North-East region
CMadrid Madrid region
C Centre region
E East region
Canaries Canaries Islands region
S South region (Omitted category)
Cohort 1945–49 Individual is born 1945–49 (Omitted category in Old Cohort estimation)
Cohort 1950–54 Individual is born 1950–54
Cohort 1955–60 Individual is born 1956–60
Cohort 1961–65 Individual is born 1961–65 (Omitted category in Young Cohort estimation)
Cohort 1966–70 Individual is born 1966–70
Cohort 1971–77 Individual is born 1971–77
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B Tables
Table 11: Ideal Number of Children for a Spanish Family1 1960–77
Number of Children Cohort 1945–60 Cohort 1961–77
0 0.5% 1.1%
1 3.4% 5.6%
2 47.7% 53.2%
3 20.0 % 17.8%
1 or 2 3.1% 4.0%
2 or 3 16.0% 11.9%
1Table does not show % for more than 3 children.
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Table 12: Timing to Marriage. Structural Form.
Cohort 1945–60 Cohort 1961–77
Variables
Coefficient Hazard Ratio Coefficient Hazard Ratio
NW 0.076 (0.112) 1.079 0.140 (0.111) 1.150
Regions NE 0.026 (0.117) 1.027 -0.298∗∗ (0.125) 0.742
Omitted CMadrid 0.066 (0.114) 1.068 -0.120 (0.123) 0.886
Category C 0.071 (0.108) 1.073 0.153 (0.102) 1.165
is S E 0.166∗ (0.094) 1.180 -0.050 (0.091) 0.952
Canaries 0.252 (0.175) 1.286 0.119 (0.163) 1.126
Sibling 0.008 (0.013) 1.008 0.016 (0.015) 1.016
DivPar Yes=1 -0.094 (0.201) 0.910 0.110 (0.143) 1.116
Religious Yes=1 0.270∗∗ (0.100) 1.310 0.290∗∗ (0.087) 1.337
Female E2 -0.080 (0.069) 0.923 -0.245∗∗ (0.079) 0.783
Education E3Voc -0.239∗ (0.134) 0.788 -0.402∗∗ (0.138) 0.669
Omitted E1 E3GrPo -0.035 (0.178) 0.965 -0.430∗∗ (0.144) 0.651
Schm6 Yes=1 -0.718∗∗ (0.149) 0.488 -1.357∗∗ (0.115) 0.257̂PEmplo Yes=1 -0.179∗∗ (0.078) 0.836 0.183∗∗ (0.087) 1.201
Tempf6 -0.009∗ (0.005) 0.991
Cohorts 1950–54 -0.035∗∗ (0.085) 0.965
Omitted 1945–49 and 1955–60 0.172 (0.083) 1.187
1961–65 for Old and 1966–70 -0.074 (0.101) 0.928
Young respectively 1971–77 -0.316∗ (0.180) 0.729
Log likelihood -6666.1 -7158.5
N subjects 1150 2228
N observations 133001 214492
∗Significant at 10% level.
∗∗Significant at 5% level.
1Standard errors in brackets.
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Table 13: Timing to 1st Child. Structural Form.
Cohort 1945–60 Cohort 1961–77
Variables
Coefficient Hazard Ratio Coefficient Hazard Ratio
NW 0.034 (0.118) 1.035 -0.276∗∗ (0.128) 0.759
Regions NE 0.012 (0.122) 1.012 -0.254∗ (0.148) 0.776
Omitted CMadrid 0.060 (0.119) 1.061 -0.352∗ (0.142) 0.703
Category C 0.219∗ (0.112) 1.245 -0.058 (0.116) 0.943
is S E -0.071 (0.100) 0.931 -0.284∗∗ (0.104) 0.753
Canaries 0.112 (0.182) 1.119 -0.0004 (0.181) 0.999
Sibling 0.033∗ (0.013) 1.034 -0.001 (0.017) 0.999
DivPar Yes=1 -0.119 (0.212) 0.888 -0.0003 (0.106) 0.999
Religious Yes=1 0.0003 (0.106) 1.0003 0.280∗∗ (0.105) 1.324
AgeMa -0.020∗ (0.010) 0.981 -0.074∗∗ (0.022) 0.929
WorkTaste Yes=1 -0.003 (0.070) 0.997 -0.237∗∗ (0.097) 0.789
Female E2 -0.028 (0.072) 0.973 -0.086 (0.010) 0.918
Education E3Voc 0.260∗ (0.154) 1.297 -0.382∗∗ (0.186) 0.682
Omitted E1 E3GrPo -0.169 (0.186) 0.845 -0.389∗ (0.202) 0.678
Partner E2P -0.088 (0.141) 0.916 -0.029 (0.228) 0.971
Education E3VocP -0.013 (0.200) 0.987 0.131 (0.308) 1.140
Omitted E1P E3GrPoP -0.318∗ (0.182) 0.728 0.085 (0.256) 1.088
Schm12 Yes=1 -0.142 (0.177) 0.868 -0.050 (0.150) 0.951̂PEmplo Yes=1 -0.292∗∗ (0.104) 0.745 -0.256∗∗ (0.124) 0.774
Tempf12 0.001 (0.005) 1.001
Cohorts 1950–54 -0.047 (0.089) 0.954
Omitted 1945–49 and 1955–60 -0.027 (0.088) 0.973
1961–65 for Old and 1966–70 -0.240∗∗ (0.114) 0.786
Young respectively 1971–77 0.067 (0.204) 1.069
Log likelihood -6104.0 -4959.9
N subjects 1041 1024
N observations 26064 25435
∗Significant at 10% level.
∗∗Significant at 5% level.
1Standard errors in brackets.
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Table 14: Timing to 2nd Child. Structural Form.
Cohort 1945–60 Cohort 1961–77
Variables
Coefficient Hazard Ratio Coefficient Hazard Ratio
NW -0.382∗∗ (0.130) 0.682 -0.232 (0.181) 0.793
Regions NE -0.443∗∗ (0.135) 0.642 0.080 (0.206) 1.083
Omitted CMadrid -0.135 (0.126) 0.874 -0.317 (0.199) 0.728
Category C -0.156 (0.121) 0.856 -0.263∗ (0.155) 0.769
is S E -0.234∗∗ (0.109) 0.791 -0.182 (0.143) 0.834
Canaries -0.137 (0.193) 0.872 -0.336 (0.259) 0.714
Sibling 0.021 (0.014) 1.021 0.029 (0.022) 1.029
DivPar Yes=1 -0.016 (0.233) 0.985 -0.018 (0.143) 0.982
Religious Yes=1 0.106 (0.125) 1.112 0.079 (0.153) 1.082
AgeAt1C -0.024∗∗ (0.011 0.976 0.002 (0.030) 1.002
MenT1C -0.176∗∗ (0.031) 0.839 -0.051 (0.046) 0.950
Girl Yes=1 -0.004 (0.073) 0.996 -0.137 (0.099) 0.872
WorkTaste Yes=1 0.014 (0.073) 1.014 -0.064 (0.104) 0.938
Female E2 0.121 (0.082) 1.128 -0.285∗∗ (0.125) 0.752
Education E3Voc 0.403∗∗ (0.168) 1.496 0.018 (0.257) 1.018
Omitted E1 E3GrPo 0.099 (0.208) 1.104 0.546∗∗ (0.274) 1.727
Partner E2P 0.059 (0.147) 1.061 -0.035 (0.283) .967
Education E3VocP 0.031 (0.222) 1.032 -0.058 (0.396) 0.944
Omitted E1 E3GrPoP 0.130 (0.199) 1.139 0.126 (0.328) 1.135
Schm12 Yes=1 -0.267 (0.275) 0.765 -0.451 (0.270) 0.992̂PEmplo Yes=1 -0.391∗∗ (0.099) 0.676 -0.270∗ (0.143) 0.763
Tempf12 -0.008 (0.104) 0.992
Cohorts 1950–54 -0.114 (0.095) 0.892
Omitted 1945–49 and 1955–60 -0.266∗∗ (0.096) 0.767
1961–65 for Old and 1966–70 -0.136 (0.169) 0.873
Young respectively 1971–77 -0.343 (0.341) 0.710
Log likelihood -5220.7 -2520.8
N subjects 1007 821
N observations 58859 36951
∗Significant at 10% level.
∗∗Significant at 5% level.
1Standard errors in brackets.
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Table 15: Timing to 3rd Child. Structural Form.
Cohort 1945–60 Cohort 1961–77
Variables
Coefficient Hazard Ratio Coefficient Hazard Ratio
NW -0.620∗∗ (0.217) 0.538 -1.318 (0.631) 0.268
Regions NE -0.408∗ (0.221) 0.665 0.296 (0.446) 1.345
Omitted CMadrid -0.665∗∗ (0.210) 0.514 -0.651 (0.642) 0.521
Category C -0.257 (0.179) 0.773 0.398 (0.342) 1.489
is S E -0.446∗∗ (0.165) 0.640 -0.164 (0.335) 0.849
Canaries 0.098 (0.262) 1.103 0.349 (0.653) 1.417
Sibling 0.052∗∗ (0.021) 1.054 0.004 (0.051) 1.003
DivPar Yes=1 -0.136 (0.357) 0.873 -0.492 (0.458) 0.611
Religious Yes=1 -0.261 (0.206) 0.770 0.228 (0.412) 1.256
AgeAt2C -0.010∗∗ (0.020) 0.905 0.121∗∗ (0.063) 0.886
MenT2C -0.214∗∗ (0.043) 0.807 -0.252∗∗ (0.100) 0.777
TwoGirls Yes=1 0.327∗∗ (0.154) 1.386 0.465 (0.307) 1.592
TwoBoys Yes=1 -0.031 (0.126) 0.970 0.328 (0.290) 1.388
WorkTaste Yes=1 0.188 (0.117) 1.206 0.161 (0.269) 1.174
Female E2 -0.152 (0.132) 0.859 -0.675∗∗ (0.289) 0.509
Education E3Voc -0.550∗∗ (0.311) 0.577 0.548 (0.621) 1.729
Omitted E1 E3GrPo -0.014 (0.388) 0.986 -1.814∗∗ (1.138) 0.163
Partner E2P -0.416∗∗ (0.195) 0.660 -0.018 (0.634) 0.982
Education E3VocP -0.122 (0.344) 0.885 -0.914 (1.039) 0.401
Omitted E1 E3GrPoP -0.086 (0.299) 0.917 0.945 (0.751) 2.573
Schm12 Yes=1 -0.239 (0.431) 1.270 0.447 (0.650) 1.563̂PEmplo Yes=1 -0.224 (0.171) 0.800 -0.344 (0.410) 0.709
Tempf12 -0.0007 (0.016) 0.999
Cohorts 1950–54 -0.456∗∗ (0.140) 0.634
Omitted 1945–49 and 1955–60 -0.666∗∗ (0.153) 0.514
1961–65 for Old and 1966–77 -0.746 (0.470) 0.474
Young respectively
Log likelihood -2015.5 -375.3
N subjects 824 436
N observations 78474 28182
∗Significant at 10% level.
∗∗Significant at 5% level.
1Standard errors in brackets.
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C Graphs
Figure 7: Evolution of Total Fertility Rates
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Figure 8: Survival in the Single State. Cohort Comparison
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Figure 9: Survival in the Married Without Children State. Cohort Comparison
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Figure 10: Survival in the Married With One Child State. Cohort Comparison
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Figure 11: Survival in the Married With Two Children State. Cohort Comparison
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